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POLICY NOTE
SELLING ITS SOUL: AN ANALYSIS OF A FORPROFIT CORPORATION’S
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY IN
AMERICA
By: Steffen Pelletier1
I. Introduction
Is it possible to consider the principles and morals
upon which a business entity is built as separate from the
individual shareholders that form the business entity—do
they make up a “soul”?
While the question above, on its face, rings more of
philosophy than law and policy, there is currently a
substantial question of law that is strikingly similar, if not
the same, yielded by the contraception mandate of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).
In brief, the PPACA, among other things, requires all
health insurance policies, including those policies made
available to subscribers through a privately held
corporation, to provide contraceptive and preventative care
for women.2 Rooted in the fundamental religious beliefs
they hold, many Americans find this so-called
“contraceptive mandate” abhorrent.3 Certainly, no one
would question that it is those Americans’ right to speak
and act in accordance with that belief. However, the more
1

J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Tennessee College of Law.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 sec. 1001(a)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2013).
3
Jack Kerwick, Backlash Against Obamacare Contraceptive Mandate,
THE NEW AM. (Jul. 3, 2013, 15:12),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/15891backlash-against-obamacare-contraceptive-mandate.
2
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complex question arises when dealing with the privately
held for-profit corporation. Specifically, assuming a
private corporation’s fundamental principles on which it
was built are in direct conflict with the entire notion of
contraceptive care, what is the extent of Congress’s ability
to require the corporation to make insurance available
covering contraceptive care?
In this policy note, I will address the many
considerations surrounding a corporation’s legal and moral
autonomy. The general threshold question is this: to what
extent is a for-profit corporation afforded religion and
speech protections separately and distinctly from its
shareholders?4 I intend this note to serve as a guide
through the myriad complicated considerations implicated
by this issue; in addition, I conclude that there is both
objective value in and legal authority supporting the
protection of a corporation’s right to act in accordance with
its religious affiliation. I will show that a corporation has a
“soul” of its own—an individual and distinct set of
principles that should be valued and protected.
II. The Development of the Law: The PPACA and
“Preventative Health Services”
The PPACA mandates that “preventative health
services” be included in healthcare plans without any cost
sharing.5 Congress did not initially define “preventative
health services” and instead authorized the Department of
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) to promulgate rules
to this effect.6 DHHS issued a preliminary rule that defined
the religious employer exception narrowly and included
4

John K. DiMugno, The Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive
Coverage Mandate, 25 No. 1 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1 (2013).
5
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
2713, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
6
3 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 13:51 (2013).
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contraception in the definition of “preventative health
service.”7 In order to qualify for the “religious employer
exception,” an organization is required to (1) have the
inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily
employ persons who share its religious views; (3) primarily
serve persons who share its religious views; and (4) be a
nonprofit organization.8 Accordingly, this exemption did
not exempt many religious employers, such as Catholic
healthcare providers, from being required to offer
contraception as part of the routine coverage policies they
Because the Catholic Church forbids
offered.9
contraception, those non-exempt Catholic organizations
would be forced to either violate their Catholic principles
or violate the newly enacted law.10 Although the DHHS
attempted to resolve the issue by delaying the date on
which religious-affiliated nonprofits were required to
comply with the law by one year and ordered the insurance
companies of those religious employers to pay for the
contraception, rather than the employers directly, the
primary dispute remained: specifically, the Catholic Church
wanted absolutely no affiliation with the provision of
contraceptives.11
7

Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv)
(2013).
8
Id.
9
3 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6.
10
See id.; Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, Vatican (July 25, 1968),
available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p
-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html.
11
See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130; 3 Religious Organizations and the Law §
13:51 (citing White House Misrepresents Its Own Contraceptive
Mandate, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-020.cfm. Additionally, the
exemption clause was again amended and expanded to define “religious
employers” only as those that are considered nonprofit religious houses
of worship and religious orders as defined by the IRS. The amended
contraception mandate, while expanded to include more groups and
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Additionally, many other nonprofits and for-profits
corporations have remained unwilling to breach their
fundamental principles by providing insurance coverage for
contraceptives. The crux of this conflict is primarily rooted
in the interplay between the federal act giving individuals
statutory claims where the government “substantially
burdens” her freedom to exercise her religion and case law
which identifies corporations as individuals.
III. Substantive Law at Issue
A. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)
of 1993 was a response to the holding of the Supreme
Court in Employment Div. v. Smith. 12 In Smith, the Court
held that the dispositive issue in evaluating the
constitutionality of a law under the First Amendment is not
whether a law suppressed an individual’s religious
practices.13 Rather, the Court held that, so long as the law
was otherwise “neutral” and “generally applicable” to all
individuals, the secondary effect of whether the law
suppressed the religious practices of some is irrelevant.14
In effect, the Court removed the sometimes ambiguous
organization, still did not provide an exemption to other non-profits,
and more extensively, for-profit corporations that asserted religious
reasons for exemption. The amended contraception mandate was
finalized on June 28, 2013. However, the mandate’s final version did
little to mitigate the increased litigation from those still outside of the
exemption. See generally DiMugno, supra note 4.
12
Codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993); Emp’t
Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990); see
Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994).
13
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
14
Id at 878-81, 876.
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weighing between two equally valid considerations: a
compelling government interest and the right an American
enjoys to practice his or her religion freely.15
Congress acted swiftly through its enactment of the
RFRA, which was not only intended to replace the Smith
standard with the compelling interest test, shifting the
burden of proof to the government, but also to provide
statutory claims and defenses for an individual where a law
“substantially burdens” his or her freedom to exercise his
or her religion.16
The RFRA provides that the
government’s burden is met if it demonstrates that the law
or policy is “(1) in a furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”17
Notably, sub-section (c) provides that “[a] person
whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of
this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief
against a government.”18 To date, the federal circuit courts
have held that subsection (c)’s use of “person” is
ambiguous and therefore, the potential application of
subsection (c) to different organizations and corporations is
a matter of statutory interpretation.19 There is a circuit split
15

Id at 879.
The RFRA provides that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability[ ]” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)); see
Klemka v. Nichols, 943 F. Supp. 470, 474 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No.95C5371, 1996 WL 22964, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1996)).
17
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added).
18
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).
19
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th
Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
16
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as to which entities may bring a claim, and, of those, which
entities may be successful in adjudicating their claims on
the merits.20
B. First Amendment and Citizens United
For-profit corporations raising claims based on the
RFRA find support in the landmark Supreme Court holding
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,21 which
held that corporations enjoy First Amendment
protections.22 The petitioner, Citizens United, sought
injunctive relief from anticipated civil and criminal
penalties that would be imposed on it following the release
of a political documentary within thirty days of the 2008
Democratic primary elections.23 The Court specifically
held that the First Amendment applies to corporations and
it “does not permit Congress to make categorical
distinctions based on corporate identity” concerning
freedom of speech.24 Further, it held that “[n]o sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on political speech of
non-profit or for-profit corporations.”25 Citizens United’s
20

Id.
See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
22
Id. at 886, 917.
23
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte v. Sebelius, 735
F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Citizens United, 558
U.S. 310).
24
The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make categorical
distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the
content of the political speech. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (citing
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778, n. 14 (1978)).
25
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315. The sweeping implications of the
holding that a corporation has its own identity that is separate from an
individual citizen cannot be understated. When analyzing whether a
section of the Bipartisan Reform Act restricting corporate speech was
21
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sweeping implication is simply this: “[t]he First
Amendment protects speech and the speaker, and the ideas
that flow from each,” regardless of whether the speaker is a
person in the literal sense or a for-profit corporation.26
IV. Action to the Courts
A. Non-Profit Dismissals
Two types of lawsuits have been filed in response to
the contraception: those brought by nonprofit religious
employers like the Catholic dioceses, and those brought by
for-profit companies owned by religious individuals who
disagree with the use of contraception.27 Many of the
claims brought by nonprofit organizations have been
dismissed on procedural grounds dealing primarily with
ripeness.28

unconstitutional, the Court noted that if the Act were imposed on an
individual citizen the government’s “time, place, and manner”
argument would not be accepted, but instead be seen as a government
action to silence suspect voices. Id. at 339.
26
Id. at 341.
27
HHS Mandate Central, THE BECKET FUND fOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/, (last visited Jan. 28,
2014). Specifically, there have been a total of 91 cases filed by over
300 plaintiffs, including 46 cases brought by for-profit companies and
45 cases brought by non-profit organizations. Additionally, there have
been 2 class action cases brought. Of those cases adjudicated on the
merits, 33 injunctions have been granted and 6 denied in cases filed by
for-profit companies, and 19 injunctions have been granted and 1
denied in cases filed by non-profit organizations. See HHS Mandate
Central, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Jan. 28,
2014).
28
DiMugno, supra note 4. (Noting the reason behind many of these
dismissals was that the DHHS was still finalizing its rules.) See
Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5879796 (M.D.
Tenn. 2012).
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B. For-Profit Litigation and Circuit Court Splits
Cases brought by for-profit corporations generally
do not share the same procedural impediments as their
nonprofit counterparts29 and have reached the United States
Courts of Appeal on the merits.30 Currently, there is a split
between five Circuit Courts on whether for-profit
corporations and their owners are able to bring First
Amendment RFRA claims.31 The Seventh and Tenth
Circuits have held that for-profit corporations and their
owners have legitimate RFRA claims.32 The D.C. Circuit
Court rejected the corporate claim, but recognized the
individual claim.33 Finally, the Third and Sixth Circuits
rejected both corporate and individual claims.34
1. Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts
In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v. Sebelius, Hobby
Lobby, a for-profit corporation, and its individual owners
filed for injunctive relief claiming that the contraception
mandate for employers violated their religious freedoms by
compelling them to fund insurance coverage for “drugs or
devices they consider to induce abortions.”35 In defense of
29

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326.
31
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte, 735 F.3d 654, 665;
Gilardi, 733 F.3d 1208; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th
Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134
S. Ct. 678 (U.S. 2013).
32
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte, 735 F.3d 654, 665.
33
Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1216.
34
Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d 618; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.,
724 F.3d 377.
35
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1141. What is problematic
about this quote is that it is from the synopsis and this exact quote is
not found within the case. The RE or stack checker should have found
30
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the PPACA, the Attorney General argued that for-profit
corporations are not considered “persons” under the RFRA
because, among other things, Congress did not specifically
include for-profit corporations as an entity offered rights
and protections under the RFRA.36 Because Congress did
not specifically define the term “person,” the United States
contended that the Tenth Circuit should adopted the
definition of ‘persons’ as defined under other laws that
excluded corporations.37
The Tenth Circuit agreed that because Congress
provided no definition for “person” within the RFRA, it left
such definition to the discretion of the court.38 However,
the Tenth Circuit turned to the Dictionary Act, in which a
corporation is included in the definition of a “person.”39
Rejecting the government’s argument, the Tenth Circuit
held that although other statutes do not include a
corporation within the definition of a “person,” the court is
not afforded the power to figuratively cut-and-paste
definitions from statute to statute.40 Accordingly, where
where this was discussed in the case and made the appropriate citation,
and then changed the language to paraphrase the same point.
36
Id. at 1128.
37
Id. at 1130 (citing The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
(1964); The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq., (2009); the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.A. §
203 (2006)). (The United States argues that for-profit corporations are
not recognized as persons? under these Acts and thus should not be
given that status under the RFRA).
38
Id. at 1129.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1130. (Rather than implying that similar narrowing
constructions should be imported into statutes that do not contain such
language, they imply Congress is quite capable of narrowing the scope
of a statutory entitlement or affording a type of statutory exemption
when it wants to. The corollary to this rule, of course, is that when the

9
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Congress did not define “person,” the court must default to
the Dictionary Act.41
In Korte v. Sebelius, the Seventh Circuit addressed
the same issue.42 Like the Tenth Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit held that corporations and individual owners might
be successful on the merits of their cases.43 However, the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis differed slightly from that of the
Tenth Circuit. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that
“nothing in the Court’s general jurisprudence of corporate
constitutional rights suggests a non-profit limitation on
organizational free-exercise rights.”44
2. D.C. Circuit Court
In Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services, the D.C. Circuit recognized that individual
corporate owners might have RFRC standing. However,
the D.C. Circuit split from the Tenth and Seventh Circuits
in its holding that a corporation itself does not have
standing to bring a claim under a RFRA.45 The court
looked to the “nature and history” surrounding the passage
of the RFRA.46 The court held that the cases that
exemptions are not present, it is not that they are “carried forward” but
rather that they do not apply).
41
Id. at 1129 (In addition, the Supreme Court has affirmed the RFRA
rights of corporate claimants, notwithstanding the claimants' decision to
use the corporate form. See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do
Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc),
aff'd, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006)
(affirming a RFRA claim brought by “a New Mexico corporation on its
own behalf”).
42
Korte, 735 F.3d at 664.
43
Id. at 665.
44
Id. at 681.
45
Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1215.
46
Id. at 1214.
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influenced the RFRA’s formation concerned individual
rights, not corporate rights, and therefore they concluded
that the RFRA does not apply to for-profit corporations.47
Furthermore, the court held that “there is no basis for
concluding that a secular organization can exercise
religion.”48 Therefore, in effect, the D.C. Circuit held that
it is simply not possible to infringe upon a secular
corporation’s freedom to exercise religion, as the
corporation is not considered a “person” under the RFRA.
The court notes that they are satisfied that the shareholders
have been “‘injured in a way that is separate and distinct
from an injury to a corporation.’”49
3. Sixth and Third Circuit Courts
In Autocam Corporation v. Sebelius, Autocam
Corporation and Autocam Medical, high-volume
manufacturing corporations owned by a single Catholic
family, brought RFRA claims seeking injunctive relief
from the contraception mandate. The Sixth Circuit held
that Autocam was barred from bringing an RFRA claim
because it was not considered a “person” under the RFRA
and that the shareholders were barred because of the
shareholder-standing rule.50 The court held that the
plaintiff’s reliance on Citizens United was “unavailing”
because the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech
Clause have historically been interpreted in different
ways.51 The Court held that while Citizen United identified
a number of cases where it recognized that corporations
enjoyed rights under the First Amendment, because these
cases only concerned freedom of speech, the Court could
47

Id.
Id. at 1215.
49
Id.
50
Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 623, 626.
51
Id. at 628.
48
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not concede that the Religious Exercise clause entailed the
same constitutional treatment.52
Likewise, in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
the Third Circuit held that for-profit secular corporations
could not assert claims under the RFRA because they were
incapable of engaging in religious exercise.53 It held that
there is no authority applying the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment to secular for-profit organizations in
the same way as the Free Speech Clause.54 The court held
that the proximity of the two clauses does not imply that all
First Amendment rights are afforded to for-profit secular
corporations.55
V. The Future for For-Profit Corporations
While the RFRA protects religious organizations
and individuals’ religious freedoms from substantially
burdensome government laws, the courts are addressing for
the first time whether for-profit corporations are considered
“persons” who have the ability and right to exercise
religious freedoms.56 Citizen United provides a compelling
argument, implying that because corporations have a
distinct voice and enjoy Freedom of Speech rights under
the First Amendment, those business entities are also
entitled to Religious Exercise rights as well.57

52

Id.
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 381.
54
Id. at 385-86. The stack checker noted that this passage concerned
the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause and not really the direct
application of the FEC to for-profit corporations. I wasn’t sure exactly
how to fix this.
55
Id. at 387.
56
Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for
Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 61 (2013).
57
Id. at 98.
53
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The primary conflict between the circuit courts
presents a more complex issue than the right to invoke the
religious protection of the First Amendment. Rather, this
issue arguably requires the reevaluation of a corporation’s
identity and ability to invoke any First Amendment
protections.58
In March of 2014, the Supreme Court will have the
opportunity to address this seemingly philosophical issue
concerning the identity of the for-profit corporation.59
However, the answer lies behind statutory analysis of the
RFRA and previous Supreme Court decisions concerning
corporate rights.60 While analyzing the Circuit courts’
holdings may provide insight into how the Supreme Court
will rule concerning for-profit corporations’ identities and
First Amendment protections, the future of for-profit,
privately owned corporations is unclear.
The idea of “corporate personhood” is not a modern
idea, but a historical practice that has evolved with our
country’s democracy.61 In today’s modern economy, a
business entity can, undoubtedly, have an identity that
includes specific goals, motives, and morals.62
Additionally, courts have recognized a business entity’s
ability to act in accordance with certain established

58

See generally DiMugno, supra note 4.
Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Birth-Control Mandate
(UPDATED), (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/court-to-rule-on-birth-controlmandate/.
60
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1129; Korte, 735 F.3d at 681.
61
John B. Stanton, Keeping the Faith: How Courts Should Determine
"Sincerely-Held Religious Belief" in Free Exercise of Religion Claims
by for-Profit Companies, 59 LOY. L. REV. 723, 748 (2013).
62
Id. at 756 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
(1983); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418 (2006)).
59
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principles. 63 What, then, creates the distinction between
nonprofit and for-profit entities so as to deny for-profit
corporations the ability to adhere to the same goals,
motives, and morals?
As the Tenth Circuit held, there is both objective
value in protecting a corporation’s right to act in
accordance with the religious affiliations upon which it was
built, as well as legal authority to support such protection.64
The Tenth Circuit held in Hobby Lobby that Hobby Lobby
considered itself a “faith-based” corporation.65 The court
noted that nonprofits have historically been afforded the
right to act in accordance with a “faith-based” identity in
the market place.66 In comparison, for-profit corporations
have a voice that is protected by the First Amendment;
furthermore, they are required to adhere to specific moral
and social standards that are in place to benefit and protect
the general public.67 Thus, disallowing a corporation’s
clear faith-based identity would contradict those moral
expectations that we as a society impose on corporations,
and the US Supreme Court has allowed to flourish.
Accordingly, and in the case of the PPACA, a for-profit
corporation should be afforded the right to act in
accordance with a faith-based identity, just as it has been
offered in those other instances discussed above.68
VI. Conclusion

63

THE BECKET FUND, Statutes of Non Profit Cases, (2013),
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/#tab1.
64
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1129.
65
Id. at 1131.
66
Id.
67
Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 44
(2013).
68
Id.
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The United States prides itself on its diversity of
views, cultures, and religions. However, respecting and
protecting the right to speak and act in accordance with
those beliefs has been of the utmost importance throughout
the nation’s history.69 The federal government is now
attempting to alter the definition of for-profit corporations
in our country by disallowing them to act upon any other
motivation than monetary ends. Allowing a for-profit
corporation to be forthcoming with its foundational
principles not only reveals its greater purpose, but also puts
the general public on notice of that purpose while allowing
the correct implementation of the contraception mandate.
Rather than restricting the ability of a for-profit corporation
to act as moral entity, the Supreme Court should consider
the sincerity of the corporation’s foundational principles.
By analyzing the sincerity of a for-profit corporation’s
motivation to adhere to specific principles, the government
is both recognizing the identity and protecting the rights of
the for-profit corporation.

69

William N. Eskridge, Jr, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2002).
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